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NOTES
THE PRIVILEGE FOR MARITAL
COMMUNICATIONS IN NEW MEXICO
The policy of the law is to require the disclosure of all information
by witnesses in order that justice may prevail. The granting of a
privilege from such disclosure constitutes an exception to that general
rule.1

Most rules of evidence are designed to test the probative value of
the offered material. Certain kinds of evidence are received or rejected depending upon their relevance and trustworthiness. However, there is an area in which evidence may be excluded even though
it may be relevant, reliable, of high probative value, and even determinative of the outcome of the case. The rules concerning privileged
communications fall within this area. They are based on a policy of
protection and allow the holder or claimant of the privilege to prevent certain communications from being disclosed in court. They
cannot "be justified as a means of promoting a fair settlement of disputes."' 2 The communications which are privileged in New Mexico

are those between husband and wife, attorney and client, clergyman
and confessor, doctor and patient, and accountant and client.' This
Note will discuss only privileged communications between husband
and wife.
The privilege for marital communications is to be distinguished

from (1) the common law rule which disqualifies the spouse of a
party or of an interested person from testifying for the other spouse
(the "marital disqualification") and (2) the common law rule that
neither spouse can appear as a witness against the other (the "antimarital privilege"). These two rules forbid the calling of the spouse
as a witness at all, regardless of the actual testimony to be elicited.
The "marital disqualification" is a rule of competency based on
the idea that the husband and wife, being one, are parties in interest.
The possibility of perjury and the belief that domestic harmony is
best promoted by removing the temptation to coerce the other
1. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E.
415,416 (1936).
2. State ex rel. State Highway Dep't v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 193 A.2d 799, 806
(Del. 1963).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-1-12(a)- (e) (1953).
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spouse into presenting favorable testimony are its main objectives.'
This rule has been abolished by statute in most jurisdictions, 5 including New Mexico ;" the interest of the witness spouse is merely
to be
7
weighed by the trier of fact in assessing his or her credibility.
The "anti-marital privilege," although sometimes confused with
the common law rule of competency, is a rule of privilege.8 It is the
privilege of a party against having his or her spouse called as an
adverse witness.' The principle reason advanced for this privilege is
to protect and preserve domestic harmony and the sanctity of the
4. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 601 (3d ed. 1940).
5. The statutes are collected in 2 Wigmore, op. cit. jupra note 4, § 488.
6. The witness-spouse may testify for his or her party-spouse in civil actions:
On the trial of any issue joined, or of any matter or question, or on any
inquiry arising in any civil suit, action or other proceeding in any court of law
or equity in this state, or before any person having by law or by consent of
parties, authority to hear, receive and examine evidence, the parties to such
proceedings, and the persons in whose behalf, any such suit, action or other
proceeding is brought or instituted, or opposed or defended, shall, except as
hereinafter excepted, be competent and compellable to give evidence either
viva voce or by deposition, according to the practice of the court, on behalf of
themselves or of either of the parties to the suit, action or proceeding; and the
husbands and wives of such parties and persons shall, except as hereinafter
excepted, be competent to give evidence, either viva voce or by deposition, according to the practice of the court, on behalf of either or any of the parties
to the said suit, action or proceeding.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-9 (1953) (Emphasis added.); and for the defendant-spouse in
criminal actions:
The husband or wife of a defendant in any criminal investigation, proceeding, preliminary hearing or trial is a competent witness to testify in favor of
but not against such defendant; provided that if willing the husband or wife
of a defendant may testify against the defendant without the defendant's consent where the prosecution is for any of the following crimes: incest, bigamy,
unlawful cohabitation, abandonment of dependents, or any unlawful violence
forcibly committed or attempted against the spouse testifying or the children
of both or either of the parties.
N.M. Star. Ann. § 40A-1-12 (1953) (Emphasis added.)
Although these two statutes are framed in terms of "competency," the New Mexico
Supreme Court has treated them as expressing a "privilege" capable of being waived
by the holder. See State v. Trujillo, 60 N.M. 277, 291 P.2d 315 (1955), construing N.M.
Laws 1935, ch. 35, § 1, and N.M. Laws 1909, ch. 98, amended and now N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40A-1-12 (1953). This construction makes the New Mexico statutes similar to those
states whose statutes are worded in terms of "privilege." See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 1881(1) (Supp. 1963) : "A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife with"
out her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband, without his consent ....
But the privilege does not apply in any civil action where the issue is "the adultery
of any party, or the husband or wife of any party to such action, suit or other proceeding," N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-11 (1953), or in any action brought under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-19-25 (1953).
7. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20:1-8 (1953).
8. 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 4, § 601.
9. McCormick, Evidence § 66 (1954).
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marriage relation, ° but one writer has suggested that actually it
arose from the "natural repugnance" of compelling one's spouse to
be the means of the other's condemnation." This spousal privilege
is qualified by the "exception by necessity," i.e., when one spouse has
committed a crime (wrong) of violence against the person of the
other, the accused can not invoke the privilege to prevent the
other's testimony. 12 The New Mexico Legislature has abolished
this rule in civil actions 13 but4 has preserved it with broadened "exceptions" in criminal actions.1

The privilege for marital communications, however, is limited to
particular testimony-communications-between the spouses during
the marital relationship. Its purpose is to encourage full and frank
disclosure and confidence between spouses, which is necessary for
mutual understanding and trust, by removing any fear that their
communications will later be made public during judicial proceedings.'" Although this privilege is a separate and distinct concept, it
was not so recognized until the incompetency of parties in interest
and their spouses was abolished in England in 185116 and 1853,17
10. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (McNaugton rev. 1961).
11. Ibid. See also Hines, Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in California,
19 Calif. L. Rev. 390, 408 (1930-1931).
12. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 10, § 2239.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-9 (1953), quoted in note 6 supra.
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-1-12 (1953), quoted in note 6 supra.
15. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 10, §2332. The privilege and its purpose are
criticized in Hines, op. cit. supra note 11, at 410-14.
16. Evidence Act, 1851, 14 & 15 Vict. 813, c. 99, § 2:
On the Trial of any Issue joined, or of any Matter or Question, or on any
Inquiry arising in any Suit, Action, or other Proceeding in any Court of Justice, or before any Person having by Law, or by Consent of Parties, Authority
* to hear, receive, and examine Evidence, the Parties thereto, and the Persons
in whose Behalf any such Suit, Action, or other Proceeding may be brought or
defended, shall, except as herein-after excepted, be competent and compellable
to give Evidence, either vivd voce or by Deposition, according to the Practice
of the Court, on behalf of either or any of the Parties to the said Suit, Action,
or other Proceeding.
17. Evidence Amendment Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vic. 578, c. 83, § 1:
On the Trial of any Issue joined, or of any Matter or Question, or on any
Inquiry arising in any Suit, Action, or other Proceeding in any Court of Justice, or before any Person having by Law or by Consent of Parties Authority
to hear, receive, and examine Evidence, the Husbands and Wives of the
Parties thereto, and of the Persons in whose Behalf any such Suit, Action or
other Proceeding may be brought or instituted, or opposed or defended, shall,
except as hereinafter excepted, be competent and compellable to give Evidence,
either ivivd voce or by Deposition according to the Practice of the Court, on behalf of either or any of the Parties to the said Suit, Action, or other Proceeding.
Compare the 1851 (supra note 16) and 1853 Acts with N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-9 (1953),
quoted in note 6 supra.
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and the privilege against adverse spousal testimony was restricted in England in 1853.18 Today, the privilege for marital
communications exists in forty-four states by statute,1" including
18. Ibid.
No Husband shall be compellable to disclose any Communication made to
him by his Wife during the Marriage, and no Wife shall be compellable to
disclose any Communication made to her by her Husband during the Marriage.
Evidence Amendment Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict. 578, c. 83, § 3.
The Act of 1853 applied only to civil actions. Thereafter, the Criminal Evidence
Act of 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. 117, c. 36, § 1, provided:
Every person charged with an offence, and the wife or husband, as the
case may be, of the person so charged, shall be a competent witness for the
defence at every stage of the proceedings, whether the person so charged is
charged solely or jointly with any other person. Provided as follows:*

,

*

*

(c) The wife or husband of the person charged shall not, save as in this
Act mentioned, be called as a witness in pursuance of this Act except upon the
application of the person so charged;
(d) Nothing in this Act shall make a husband compellable to disclose any
communication made to him by his wife during the marriage, or a wife compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during
the marriage ....
In Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] 1 All E.R. 827 (C.A.), the English Court of Appeals
said there was no common law rule protecting marital communications as such and that
a spouse's privilege in this respect was entirely the creature of § 3 of the 1853 Act. This
statement was criticized in Note, 56 L.Q. Rev. 137 (1940), but was approved by the
House of Lords in Rumping v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] 3 All E.R. 256
(H.L.). However, Wigmore says that the communications privilege was recognized in
England before 1853 (8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 10, §2333), and several United
States courts have frequently said that "statutes protecting marital communications
from disclosure are declaratory of the common law," McCormick, op. cit. supra note 9,
§ 82 n.12, although no common law decision can be found sanctioning the privilege in
advance of a statute in those states which have such statutes.
The pre-1853 cases which are summarized and analyzed by Greene, M.R., in
Shenton, relate to the competency of a spouse as a witness and not to the question of a
privilege not to disclose marital communications. But see Note, 56 L.Q. Rev. 137 (1940).
McCormick concludes that the statutes granting the privilege represent expressions
of a common policy, announced first by treatise writers before 1853, that spouses should
be assured that the communications to each other would not be disclosed. See McCormick, op. cit. supra note 9, § 82.
19. Alaska R. Civ. P. 43(a) (1) ; Alaska R. Crim. P. 26(b) (2) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-2232 (1956) (civil) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1802 (Supp. 1963) (criminal);
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-601 (1947) ; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1881 (1) (Supp. 1963) ; Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-7(1) (1953) ; D.C. Code Ann. § 14-307 (1961) ; Ga. Code Ann.
§ 38-418 (Supp. 1963) ; Hawaii Rev. Laws § 222-19 (1955) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 9203(1) (Supp. 1963) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1950) (civil) ; Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 734 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1963) (criminal); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1714
(1946) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 622.9 (1950) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-2805 (1949) ; Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.210(1) (1963); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:461 (1950); Md. Ann.
Code art. 35, §4 (1957) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20 (1956) ; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 27A.2162 (1962); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02(1) (1947) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 491.020
(1952) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-701-4(1) (1947) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1204
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New Mexico,2 ° and in five states by judicial decision.21
Unfortunately, many states have united the communications privilege with the anti-marital privilege in the same statute,2 2 and this
has resulted in a few statutes and courts indicating the policy of one
is the policy of the other privilege.2 3 The policy behind each is different, and it is important to keep this difference in mind so that each
(1943); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.040 (1957); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516:27 (1955); N.J.
Stat. Ann. §2A:84A-22 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4502(b) ; N.Y. Pen. Law
§ 2445; N.C. Gen. Star. § 8-56 (1951) (civil); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (Supp. 1963)
(criminal) ; N.D. Cent. Code. § 31-01-02 (1960) Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.02 (Page
1953); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 385(3) (1960) (civil) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 702
(Supp. 1963) (criminal); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 44.040(1) (a) (Supp. 1963); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 19, § 684 (1930) (criminal) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, §§ 316, 320 (1958) (civil) ; R.I.
Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-17-13 (1956) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 26-403 (1962) ; S.D. Code
§ 36.0101(1) (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-103 (1955); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art.
3715 (1926) ; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 714 (1941) ; Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1)
(1953) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1605 (1958) ; Va. Code Ann. § 8-288 (Supp. 1962)
(criminal) ; Va. Code Ann. § 8-289 (1950) (civil) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060(1)
(1963) ; W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 4992(b), 5729 (1961) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 325.18 (1958)
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-139 (1957).
20. N.M. Stat. Ann. §20-1-12(a) (1953).
21. Alabama: Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425 (1885) ; Delaqware: State v. Thompson, 50
Del. (11 Terry) 562, 136 A.2d 336 (1957) ; Florida:Rance v. Hutchinson, 131 Fla. 460,
179 So. 777 (1938) ; Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154 (1898) ; Maine: Holyoke
v. Holyoke's Estate, 110 Me. 469, 87 Atd. 40 (1913) ; Mississippi: Martin v. State, 203
Miss. 187, 33 So. 2d 825 (1948) ; Carter v. State, 167 Miss. 331, 145 So. 739 (1933)
Hesdorffer v. Hiller, 111 Miss. 16, 71 So. 166 (1916).
Connecticut seems to have no privilege for marital communications either by statute
or decision. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-84 (1958).
22. Alaska, Arizona (criminal), California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New York (criminal), North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. The statutes are cited in note 19 supra.
23. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1881 (Supp. 1963):
There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be
examined as a witness in the following cases:
(1) Husband and wife. A husband cannot be examined for or against his
wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband, without his
consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterward, be, without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other
during the marriage . ...
See also Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 21 F. Supp. 159 (S.D. Cal. 1937) ; Mercer
v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154, 157 (1898):
Society has a deeply-rooted interest in the preservation of the peace of families,
and in the maintenance of the sacred institution of marriage; and its strongest
safeguard is to preserve with jealous care any violation of those hallowed confidences inherent in, and inseparable from, the marital status. Therefore the
law places the ban of its prohibition upon any breach of the confidence between
husband and wife, by declaring all confidential communications between them
to be incompetent matter for either of them to expose as witnesses.

NATURAL

[VOL. 4

RESOURCES JOURNAL

privilege may be kept within its proper scope.24 To illustrate the
application of these two distinct policies, it is generally held that the
communications privilege transcends both death and divorce, in
order to encourage complete communication and confidence during
marriage, but the anti-marital privilege does not because death and
divorce leave no marriage to be protected.25
The New Mexico statute was enacted in 1880,2 and provides:
No husband shall be compelled to disclose any communication
made by his wife during the marriage, and no wife shall be compelled to disclose any
communication made to her by her husband
27
during the marriage.
With the exception of the word "compelled," it is identical only to
the English Evidence Amendment Act of 1853,28 which was copied
verbatim by Hawaii in 1876.29 The English and Hawaii statutes
use the word "compellable." It seems reasonable to assume that the
New Mexico statute is derived from the Act of 1853.S ° The New
Mexico statute has never been construed by the courts. 31 Therefore,
this Note will discuss privileged marital communications in general
and suggest certain interpretations of the statute in specific instances.

I

SCOPE OF A "COMMUNICATION

"3

2

24. This is not to say, however, that the communications privilege was designed
without some view to avoiding marital discord. But such is the primary purpose for
the anti-marital privilege, not the communications privilege. See note 162 infra.
25. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) ; Posner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
56 Ariz. 202, 106 P,2d 488 (1940) ; see also 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 10, § 2334.
Also, the defendant in a criminal trial may waive his privilege of preventing his
wife from testifying against him by calling her to the stand to testify in his behalf.
State v. Moore, 42 N.M. 135, 76 P.2d 19 (1938). But he may still be able to prevent
her from disclosing communications made between them while married, unless he has
waived this privilege.
26. N.M. Laws 1880, ch. 12, § 7.
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12(a) (1953).
28. 16 & 17 Vict. 578, c. 83, § 3; quoted in note 18 rupra.
29. Hawaii Laws 1876, ch. 32, § 54; see Hawaii Rev. Laws § 222-19 (1955). There
are no decisions construing the Hawaii statute.
30. This Note is written on the basis of this assumption.
31. In Murray v. Murray, 30 N.M. 557, 240 Pac. 303 (1925), the plaintiff sued her
mother-in-law for alienation of her (plaintiff's) husband's affections. The defendant
objected to the admission of certain letters from the husband to the plaintiff on the
ground they were privileged communications. On this point the court said only that
the statute protecting marital communications was inapplicable.
32. See generally Note, 47 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 205 (1956) ; Note, 56 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 208, 220-22 (1961) ; Note, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 590, 593-95 (1952).
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The New Mexico statute refers to "any communication." All
courts would agree that verbal statements, whether oral or written,
are communications.3 3 Should the term include acts committed by
one spouse in the presence of the other? The courts are divided on
this issue. 4 The broadness or narrowness of a particular court's interpretation depends on the wording of the particular statute.Y5
Those cases which say it does may be grouped into three types: ( 1 )
where an intent to communicate a message to the other spouse is
manifest; (2) where the intent is not readily discernable but is inferred from the fact of the marital relation; and (3) where there
exists, either inferentially or actually, an intent not to communicate.
The first type is identical to verbal communications but for the
act of speaking or writing. For example, a husband asks his wife if
she has received a particular letter. She does not answer, but produces the letter or nods her head in the affirmative. Such an act
should be deemed a "communication," because a clear intent to convey a message is manifest from the act itself.
In the type (2) cases the courts have based their decisions on the
assumption that an intent to communicate necessarily exists where
33. See, e.g., State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724. (1946), vacated, 333 U.S.
95 (1948) (oral) ; People v. Harris, 39 Misc. 2d 193, 240 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1963)
(letters).
Webster defines the terms as "intercourse by words, letters, or messages; interchange of thoughts or opinions, by conference or other means; converse, correspondence." Webster's New International Dictionary 541 (2d ed. 1960).
But the fact of the communication is not privileged. In re Pusey's Estate, 180 Cal.
368, 181 Pac. 648 (1919).
34-. Privilege applies: Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425, 56 Am. Rep. 40 (1885) ; Griffith
v. Griffith, 162 Ill. 368, 44 N.E. 820 (1896) ; Smith v. State, 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803
(1926) ; Perry v. Randall, 83 Ind. 143 (1882) ; Commonwealth v. Sapp, 90 Ky. L. Rep.
580, 14 S.W. 834 (1890) ; People v. Gessinger, 238 Mich. 625, 214 N.W. 184 (1927) ;
Whitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737, aff'd, 62 So. 432 (1913) ; People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949), 35 Corn. L.Q. 187 (1949) ; People v. Woltering, 275 N.Y. 51i 9 N.E.2d 774 (1937) (dictum) ; State v. Jolly & Whitely, 20 N.C. (3
Dev. & Bat.) 108 (1838) ; Niles v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. 447, 284 S.W. 568 (1926);
In re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 Pac. 15 (1927) ; Menefee v. Commonwealthi 189
Va. 900,-55 S.E.2d 9 (1949), 34 Minn. L. Rev. 257 (1949-1950) ; State v. Americk, 42
Wash. 2d 504, 256 P.2d 278 (1953) ; State v. Robbins, 35 Wash. 2d 389, 213 P.2d 310
(1950).
Privilege does not apply: Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) ; Posner v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Ariz. 202, 106 P.2d 488 (1940) ; Tanzola v. De Rita, 45 Cal.
2d 1, 285 P.2d 897 (1955) ; In re Pusey's Estate, 180 Cal. 368, 181 Pac. 648 (1919);
People v. Keller, 165 Cal. App. 2d 419, 332 P.2d 174 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ; State
v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 260 Pac. 138 (1927).
See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1389 (1950).
35. The cases decided under those statutes which expressly extend the privilege to
acts will not be considered. See the statutes of Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont, cited in
note 19 supra.
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the act is done in the known presence of the other spouse. For example, in Menefee v. Commonwealth, 6 the defendant's wife saw
him leave home on the night of the burglary, return late and in a
nervous condition, and place a pistol on the mantle in the house.
Later he drove her through the area where the stolen safe was subsequently found. The Virginia court held these acts were "private
communications ' 37 about which the wife could not testify. And in
People v. Daghita,38 the New York Court of Appeals held that the
defendant's wife could not testify about his acts of bringing stolen
property into their house and hiding it in her presence, because they
were "confidential communications. ' "" Implicit in both decisions is
an assumption that the defendant intended that the act would be
perceived as well as held inviolate by his spouse. It has been suggested that these decisions actually rest "on the broader premise
that the policy of the privilege dictates protection of all knowledge
gained by virtue of the marital relationship ....
In the cases where an intent not to communicate is present, the
36. 189 Va. 900, 55 S.E.2d 9 (1949), 34 Minn. L. Rev. 257 (1949-1950).
37. See Va. Code Ann. § 8-289 (1950):
Neither husband nor wife shall, without the consent of the other, be examined in any case as to any communication privately made by one to the
other while married, nor shall either be permitted, without such consent, to
reveal in testimony after the marriage relation ceases any such communication
made while the marriage subsisted. [Emphasis added.]
38. 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949), 35 Corn. L.Q. 187 (1949).
39. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2445:
The husband or wife of a person indicted or accused of a crime is in all
cases a competent witness, on the examination or trial of such person; but
neither husband nor wife can be compelled to disclose a confidential communication, made by one to the other during their marriage. [Emphasis added.]
See also People v. Gessinger, 238 Mich. 625, 214 N.W. 184 (1927), where the court
held the wife could not testify that she returned home from the theater and saw stolen
goods on the table which had not been there before she left, and that later she saw the
same goods in the back of their automobile.
In State v. Robbins, 35 Wash. 2d 389, 213 P.2d 310 (1950), the defendant was
charged with automobile theft. Testimony by his former wife (they were married when
the acts were performed) that he was sitting in the automobile parked in front of a
public building while she was inside the building purchasing license plates for the
auto was declared inadmissible since such acts were privileged "communications."
The court said: "It is obvious that he would not have waited in the automobile had he
not relied upon the confidence between them by reason of the marital relation." 213
P.2d at 314. McCormick calls Robbins the "reductio ad absurdum" of the "acts" cases.
McCormick, Evidence § 83 n.8 (1954).
40. Note, 47 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 205, 208 (1956).
See also Todd v. Barbee, 271 Ky. 381, 111 S.W.2d 1041, 1043 (Ct. App. 1937),
quoting from Commonwealth v. Sapp, 90 Ky. L. Rep. 580, 14 S.W. 834, 835 (1890):
The word 'communication,' therefore, as used in our statute, should be given a
liberal construction. It should not be confined to a mere statement by the husband to the wife or vice versa, but should be construed to embrace all knowl-
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courts rest their finding of a "communication" solely on the fact of
the marital relation. For example, in Smith v. State,41 the accused's
wife saw blood in the kitchen where the accused had killed his
mother-in-law, and then she saw him dump a trunk containing the
body into a privy vault. The court held these acts were "communications" but denied the privilege on the ground that they were not
"confidential" because the accused did not know of his wife's observations. Another example is where a husband has a mental problem or disease. Though he may seek to conceal it, the closeness of
the marital relation causes its revelation. Some courts protect these
observations by the other spouse by denominating them "communications," presumably on the ground that the false pride or shame
which caused the afflicted spouse to refrain from verbally disclosing
his condition to the other should not prevent the application of the
privilege."2
For the following reasons, it is submitted that the New Mexico
courts should not bring the acts described in (2) and (3) within the
scope of a "communication."
The verb "to communicate" necessarily involves an intent on the
part of the communicator to convey some information to another. It
is apparent, therefore, that the acts described in type (3), involving
an intent not to communicate, cannot intelligently be brought within

the scope of the term. 3 Since the prohibition against disclosing such
acts has to be based on some other reason than a finding of "communication," the person seeking to prevent disclosure must
base his
44
argument on some other ground than the privilege statute.

edge upon the part of the one or the other obtained by reason of the marriage
relation, and which, but for the confidence growing out of it, would not have
been known to the party.
41. 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803 (1926).
42. See, e.g., Griffith v. Griffith, 162 Ill. 368, 44 N.E. 820 (1896) (husband's impotency and habits of self-abuse) ; In re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 Pac. 15 (1927)
(observation by wife of an injury to her husband's sexual organs) ; contra, Posner v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Ariz. 202, 106 P.2d 488 (1940) (husband purchased insulin
for his wife and saw her make a urine test to determine whether she had diabetes).
43. "[A] communication is ordinarily considered to be a deliberate interchange of
thoughts or opinions ....
" Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nelson, 384 P.2d 914, 920
(Okla. 1963).
44. In Smith v. State, 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803 (1926), see note 41 supra, the court
said the "communication" was not privileged because it was not confidential. And it
was reasoned to be unconfidential because the accused did not know of his wife's observations. But how could the court have found a "communication" when the communicator did not know of the communicatee's presence?
In the case of the spouse with the mental problem or disease, it would seem that
society's interest in keeping its members healthy outweighs any benefit that could be
gained from preventing disclosure.
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Most of the cases in type (2) are criminal proceedings, and the
effect of the decisions is to protect acts committed by a spouse in the
furtherance of a crime or fraud.4 5 Why should a man guilty of a
crime be set free merely because it was his good fortune to have only
his wife as a witness? The attorney-client privilege does not extend
to communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose
of being advised in the commission of a crime or the perpetration of
a fraud;46 the policy of the privilege-freedom of disclosure and
confidence between the attorney and his client 4 7-is overridden by
larger considerations of public policy against promoting crime.4
The same considerations of public policy should override the policy
of the marital communications privilege (which is similar to the
policy of the attorney-client privilege) -freedom of disclosure and
confidence between spouses-so as to prevent any extension of the
privilege to acts committed by a spouse, where there is no manifest
intent to convey a message to the other spouse, in the furtherance of
a crime or fraud.49 It may be true that society has a greater interest
in the marital relation than the attorney-client relation; and for this
reason it is arguable that verbal and written messages between
spouses and acts manifesting an intent to convey a message to the
other should not lose their privilege because they are in furtherance
of a crime or fraud. The addressee spouse may be more successful
than the attorney in discouraging the other spouse from pursuing
such a course of conduct. ° But it is also true that to extend the priv45. See, e.g., Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425, 56 Am. Rep. 40 (1885) ; Commonwealth v.
Sapp, 90 Ky. L. Rep. 580, 14 S.W. 834 (1890) ; People v. Gessinger, 238 Mich. 625, 214
N.W. 184 (1927) ; People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194-, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949) ; State v.
Jolly & Whitely, 20 N.C. (3 Dev. & Bat.) 108 (1838) ; Niles v. State, 104- Tex. Crim.
447, 284 S.W. 568 (1926); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 55 S.E.2d 9
(1949) ; State v. Americk, 42 Wash. 2d 504, 256 P.2d 278 (1953) ; State v. Robbins, 35
Wash. 2d 389, 213 P.2d 310 (1950).
46. See, e.g., Abbot v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 19, 177 P.2d 317 (1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1947) (crime) ; Agnew v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. App. 2d 838, 320 P.2d 158
(2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (fraud).
The California attorney-client privileged communications statute is identical with
New Mexico's. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1881(2) (Supp. 1963), and N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 20-1-12(b) (1953).
47. People ex rel. Dep't Pub. Works v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 369 P.2d 1, 19
Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962).

48. See McCormick, Evidence § 99 (1954).
49. The decisions in which testimony given by one spouse as to the criminal acts of
the other has been held admissible, do not give any reason other than the statement that
the acts did not constitute "communications." See, e.g., State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181,
260 Pac. 138 (1927).
50. Further, in the normal situation, the communicating spouse would not converse
with an attorney until after he had committed the crime and had been arrested.

MAY, 1964]

NO TES

ilege to such communications or acts in both the spousal and attorney-client situations means that a murderer may be set free or a defrauded person is never to be compensated for the wrong committed
upon him.5 ' Therefore, when an intent to communicate cannot be
readily found, the court should not infer the necessary intent so as
to bring the act within the scope of a "communication." To find such
intent from the assumption that the act would not have been performed but for the marital relation is untenable in the face of opposing policy considerations.
When the courts have inferred the requisite intent from the fact
of the marital relation, they have based their findings on a misinterpretation of the purpose of the communications privilege. Phrases
in these cases such as "to preserve the marriage relation ' 52 and to
promote and foster "the peace of families" 53 relate to the purpose
of the anti-marital privilege, not the communications privilege. 4
II
CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMUNICATIONS

To what kind of communications does the privilege attach? Some
statutes explicity require the element of confidence, 5 but most statutes, like New Mexico's, do not.56 However, most of the statutes
which refer to any communication have been narrowly construed to
51. A United States Court of Appeals held that the Tennessee statute, which expressly extends the privilege to "any matter that occurred between them by virtue of or
in consequence of the marital relation," (Tenn. Code Ann. §24-103 (1955)), does not
"necessarily extend to those communications and acts which are in furtherance of a
fraud . . . ." Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 144 (6th Cir. 1944).
52. People v. Gessinger, 238 Mich. 625, 214 N.W. 184, 185 (1927) (concurring
opinion of Sharpe, J.).
53. Whitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737, 738, afr'd, 62 So. 432 (1913) ; see
also Huffman v. Simmons, 131 Pa. Super. 370, 200 Ati. 274, 278 (1938).
54. See notes 10 and 15 supra and accompanying text.
55. Confidential: D.C. Code Ann. § 14-307 (1961) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.210(1)
(1963) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 35, §4 (1957) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §491.020 (1952); N.J.
Stat. Ann. §2A:84A-22 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4502(b) (civil); N.Y.
Pen. Law § 2445 (criminal) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-56 (1951) (civil) ; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 8-57 (Supp. 1963) (criminal); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 684 (1930) (criminal); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 28 §§ 316, 320 (1958) (civil) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 26-403 (1962) (civil)
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3715 (1926) ; W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 4992(b), 5729 (1961).
Private:La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:461 (1950); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, §20
(1956) ; Va. Code Ann. § 8-289 (1950) (civil) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 325.18 (1958).
56. See the statutes of Alaska (civil and criminal), Arizona (civil and criminal),
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois (civil and criminal), Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma (civil), Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina (criminal),
South Dakota, Utah, and Washington, cited in note 19 supra.
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extend the privilege only to "confidential" or "private" communications between the spouses."7 This is a reasonable limitation on a
privilege which can cause the exclusion of relevant and reliable
testimony.
The communication must have been intended by the communicating spouse to be confidential in order to be privileged, 58 but confidence or privacy is presumed to have been intended in all marital
communications until the subject of the message or the circumstances
demonstrate the contrary.5 For example, a husband's making the
57. Arizona: Arizona Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Wagner, 75 Ariz. 82, 251
P.2d 897 (1953) (private and confidential); California: Tanzola v. De Rita, 45 Cal.
2d 1, 285 P.2d 897 (1955) ; Leemhuis v. Leemhuis, 137 Cal. App. 2d 117, 289 P.2d 852
(2d Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (confidential) ; Iova: Shepherd v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
230 Iowa 1304, 300 N.W. 556 (1941); Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 105 N.W. 314
(1905) (private or confidential) ; cf. Rodskier v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 216
Iowa 121, 248 N.W. 295 (1933) (all communications) ; Michigan: People v. Zabijak,
285 Mich. 164, 280 N.W. 149 (1938) ; People v. Rosa, 268 Mich. 462, 256 N.W. 483
(1934) ; Thayer v. Thayer, 188 Mich. 261, 154 N.W. 32 (1915) (confidential) ; Montana: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mason, 272 Fed. 28 (9th Cir. 1921) ; Thompson v.
Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 187 P.2d 1018 (1947) (confidential) ; Nebraska: Blohme v.
Blohme, 166 Neb. 369, 89 N.W.2d 127, rehearing denied, 167 Neb. 1, 91 N.W.2d 30
(1958) (confidential) ; Rhode Island: Bradley v. Quinn, 53 R.I. 349, 166 Atl. 814 (1933)
(confidential) ; South Carolina: State v. Reynolds, 48 S.C. 384, 26 S.E. 679 (1897) (confidential) ; Utah: State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724 (1946), vacated, 333 U.S.
95 (1948); In re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 Pac. 15 (1927) (confidential) ; Washington: State v. Fiddler, 57 Wash. 2d 815, 360 P.2d 155 (1961) (confidential).
England: Rumping v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] 3 All. E.R. 256 (H.L.)
Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] 1 All E.R. 827 (C.A.) (private) ; Regina v. Pamenter, 12
Cox. Crim. Cas. 177 (1872) (confidential).
Contra, Patterson v. Skoglund, 181 Ore. 167, 180 P.2d 108 (1947) ; Pugsley v.
Smyth, 98 Ore. 448, 194 Pac. 686, 696 (1921):
[T]he words 'any communication' mean that all communications between husband and wife are privileged, unless express or implied consent to publication
is given, or unless the privilege is lost by being brought within one of the
exceptions specified by the Code.
However, in Oregon communications made in the presence of third persons are not
privileged. Ross v. Hayes, 176 Ore. 225, 157 P.2d 517 (1945) ; Coles v. Harsch, 129
Ore. 11, 276 Pac. 248 (1929). See also Hurley, Privileged Communications in Oregon,
36 Ore. L. Rev. 132, 137-38 (1957).
"Private" may be the better word. In Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934), the
Court held that the contents of a letter dictated by the defendant, addressed to his wife,
and transcribed by the stenographer could be disclosed by the stenographer in court.
The defendant intended the contents to be confidential, but the stenographer eliminated
any privacy between the spouses.
58. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2336 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
59. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) ; Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180
F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 187 P.2d 1018
(1947) ; People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191, 104 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
aff'd, 303 N.Y. 782, 103 N.E.2d 895 (1952) ; Hazlett v. Bryant, 192 Tenn. 251, 241
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same communication to persons in addition to his wife rebuts any
presumption that he intended it to be confidential. 60 And courts generally say that a spouse can testify as to a communication made in
the presence or hearing of a third person."' However, this rule
should not apply unless the communicating spouse knew of the third
person's presence, so as to rebut the presumption that he intended
the communication to be confidential. 6 2 Statements made by one
spouse to another in the presence of children who are old enough to
fully understand what is being said are not confidential.6 3 And
private communications between spouses relative primarily to business matters are not confidences, 4 because it is assumed that the
communicating spouse intended that third persons should know of
such conversations.
A third person may testify as to an oral communication between
spouses which he has overheard either accidently or by design" and
to the contents of a written communication which he has secured by
S.W.2d 121 (1951) ; see also McCormick, Evidence § 84 (1954) ; 8 Wigmore, op. cit.
supra note 58, § 2336 n.1.
But see Tanzola v. De Rita, 45 Cal. 2d 1, 285 P.2d 897 (1955) (language in opinion
indicating that the person asserting the privilege must initially show confidentiality).
60. Arizona Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Wagner, 75 Ariz. 82, 251 P.2d 897
(1953) ; Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 187 P.2d 1018 (1947).
61. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Tabbah v. United States, 217 F.2d
528 (5th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1952) ; People v.
Gaines, 58 Cal. 2d 630, 375 P.2d 296, 25 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1962) (dictum); Master v.
Master, 223 Md. 618, 166 A.2d 251 (1960); Oliver v. Oliver, 325 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959); People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78, 176 N.E.2d 81, 217 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961);
De Wolf v. State, 245 P.2d 107 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952) ; Pugsley v. Smyth, 98 Ore.
448, 194 Pac. 686 (1921).
The same principle applies to documents. In State v. Fiddler, 57 Wash. 2d 815, 360
P.2d 155 (1961), the court held that the husband's letter to his wife, which was intended
to be read by others because she could not read, was not a confidential communication.
62. See People v. Palumbo, 5 I1. 2d 409, 125 N.E.2d 518 (1955) ; McCormick, op.
cit. supra note 59, § 84; see also Note, 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 454, 456-59 (1962).
63. Master v. Master, 223 Md. 618, 166 A.2d 251 (1960) ; Fuller v. Fuller, 100 W.
Va. 309, 130 S.E. 270 (1925) ; Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1960).
The court is to determine whether the child was old enough. Freeman v. Freeman,
238 Mass. 150, 130 N.E. 220 (1921).
64. Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 105 N.W. 314 (1905) ; Durr v. Vick, 345 S.W.2d
165 (Mo. 1961) ; Brooks v. Brooks, 357 Mo. 343, 208 S.W.2d 279 (1948) ; see also
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 835 (1949).
65. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) ; People v. Peak, 66 Cal. App. 2d 894,
153 P.2d 464 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1944); State v. Wilkins, 72 Ore. 77, 142 Pac. 589
(1914) ; State v. Thorne, 43 Wash. 2d 47, 260 P.2d 331 (1953) ; Nash v. FidelityPhenix Fire Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 672, 146 S.E. 726 (1929) ; see also Annot., 63 A.L.R.
107 (1929).
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interception6 6 or through misdelivery by the custodian.67 This result
seems to be based on the theory that the holder has no privilege to
suppress the testimony of third persons, rather than on a lack of confidentiality; because although the third person may testify as to both
oral and written communications overheard or intercepted, the privilege between the spouses has been held to survive.66 However, when
the eavesdropping or the delivery or disclosure of the written communication is due to the betrayal of the non-communicating spouse,
the third person has been prohibited from testifying as to the message.6 9 This result is correct if the privilege belongs to the communicating spouse;7° since the non-communicating spouse could not
testify as to the message over objection by the communicating spouse,
he or she should not be permitted to destroy the privilege by betraya1. 7 ' Nevertheless, other courts have disregarded the element of be72
trayal and have held the privilege is not applicable.
66. Batchelor v. State, 217 Ark. 340, 230 S.W.2d 23 (1950) ; Rumping v. Director of
Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] 3 All E.R. 256 (H.L.) ; contra, McKie v. State, 165 Ga. 210,
140 S.E. 625 (1927).
67. O'Toole v. Ohio German Fire Ins. Co., 159 Mich. 187, 123 N.W. 795 (1909)
Hammons v. State, 73 Ark. 495, 84 S.W. 718 (1905).
68. De Leon v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 161, 80 Pac. 348 (1905) ; People v. Peak, 66 Cal.
App. 2d 894, 153 P.2d 464 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 110
Mass. 181 (1872) ; Nash v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 672, 146 S.E. 726
(1929).
69. McCoy v. Justice, 199 N.C. 637, 155 S.E. 452 (1930) (letter) ; see also Hunter v.
Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951) (eavesdropper).
70. See 8 Wigmore, oP. cit. suPra note 58, § 2339(2).
71. In Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920), the defendant was charged
with conspiracy to steal an automobile. He was tried separately after his two co-conspirators had been found guilty and sentenced in a separate trial. One of the convicted
co-conspirators, a woman, was the state's witness. This witness, X, had written a letter
to her husband while she was in prison, and her husband showed it to the defendant's
attorney. The defense sought to introduce the contents of this letter through X's husband, a defense witness. The prosecution objected to its admission, contending it was a
privileged communication. The trial court sustained this objection, and the supreme
court affirmed. The communication was held to be confidential and privileged, the wife
was declared to be the holder of the privilege-not the husband, the prosecution was
permitted to assert the privilege for the holder, and the husband's disclosure of the
letter's contents did not destroy the privilege.
72. McNeill v. State, 117 Ark. 8, 173 S.W. 826, 828 (1915):
[W]here the letters [written by the husband to his wife and delivered to her]
fall into the hands of a third person, without being taken forcibly from the
wife or by other sort of compulsion to obtain them from her, they are competent
evidence against the husband.
In Arkansas the privilege apparently belongs to both spouses, Reaves v. Coffman, 87
Ark. 60, 112 S.W. 194 (1908).
See also State v. Sysinger, 25 S.D. 110, 125 N.W. 879 (1910). In South Dakota the
privilege belongs to both spouses, Krueger v. Dodge, 15 S.D. 159, 87 N.W. 965 (1901).
It seems that in these two criminal cases the policy against promoting crime overrode the policy of the marital communications privilege.

III
WHO IS THE HOLDER OF THE PRIVILEGE?

Before deciding whether or not a privilege may be successfully
claimed so as to exclude a given communication, it is often necessary, as a preliminary question, for the court to ascertain to whom
the privilege belongs. It is settled that the privilege 73is personal to
the partners of the marriage, and not to third persons.
Regarding the spouses, jurisdictions differ as to who is the holder.
The language of the applicable statute should serve as a preliminary
focal point. However, the statutes are not of themselves definitive,
but are subject to the implications and limitations read into them
on the basis of other factors. For example, under similar statutes
which read "nor can either, during the marriage or afterward, be,
without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication
made by one to the other during marriage," the California and Minnesota courts accord the privilege to both spouses, 7 * while the Colorado, Oregon, and Washington courts say that only the communicating spouse is the holder. 7 The New York civil statute 76 has been
construed to give the privilege to both spouses,7 while under its
73. Murray v. Murray, 30 N.M. 557, 240 Pac. 303 (1925) ; see note 31 supra. See
also McAllister v. McAllister, 72 Colo. 28, 209 Pac. 788 (1922).
In Martin v. State, 203 Miss. 187, 33 So. 2d 825 (1948), the defendant-son was
charged with assault with intent to murder his father, and the prosecution sought to
introduce a letter from the father to his wife, who was a witness for the defense. The
court held that the letter was a confidential communication, but that the defendant could
not object to its admission. The court indicated that the letter would have been kept out
had the witness-wife objected, since the privilege apparently belongs to either spouse
in Mississippi criminal cases.
74. California:Leemhuis v. Leemhuis, 137 Cal. App. 2d 117, 289 P.2d 852 (2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1955) ; In re De Neef, 42 Cal. App. 2d 691, 109 P.2d 741 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1941). The statute construed is now Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1881(1) (Supp. 1963).
Minnesota: State v. Warren, 252 Minn. 261, 89 N.W.2d 702 (1958), construing
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02(1) (1947).
75. Colorado: Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920) ; see note 71 supra.
The statute is Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-7(1) (1953).
Oregon: Coles v. Harsch, 129 Ore. 11, 276 Pac. 248 (1929) ; see also Hurley, Privileged Communications in Oregon, 36 Ore. L. Rev. 132, 143 (1957). The Oregon statute
is Ore. Rev. Stat. §44.040(1) (a) (Supp. 1963).
Washington: Swearingen v. Vik, 51 Wash. 2d 843, 322 P.2d 876 (1958). The statute
is Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060(1) (1963).
76. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4502(b) :
A husband or wife shall not be required, or, without the consent of the
other if living, allowed, to disclose a confidential communication made by one to
the other during marriage.
77. Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Salamon v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 10 F.R.D. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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criminal statute 78 "the privilege really belongs to the spouse against
whom the testimony is offered. ' 7 The North Carolina statute,
which provides that "no husband or wife shall be compellable to
disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other
during their marriage,"8 ° has been construed to mean that where
one spouse confides in the other, both spouses are given a privilege
not to disclose the communication, but either can waive it for both.8 '
And under the English statute, which says that "no Husband shall
be compellable to disclose any Communication made to him by his
Wife during the Marriage, and no Wife shall be compellable to
disclose any Communication made to her by her Husband during the
Marriage," 8 2 the privilege is deemed to belong only to the addressee
spouse.

83

According the privilege to the communicating spouse is preferable, because this would best preserve the policy of encouraging
freedom of communication and confidence between spouses. 8 4 Granting the privilege to both spouses would be sound but for the fact that
the situation could arise where one spouse needs the testimony of the
other who maliciously or capriciously refuses to give it by invoking
his or her privilege. And giving the privilege only to the addressee
spouse (the English rule) clearly contravenes the policy of the privilege, since this would leave the party most likely to be prejudiced by
the testimony without the protection of the privilege. 5
78. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2445:
The husband or wife of a person indicted or accused of a crime is in all
cases a competent witness, on the examination or trial of such person; but
neither husband nor wife can be compelled to disclose a confidential communication, made by one to the other during their marriage.
79. People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78, 176 N.E.2d 81, 83 n.1, 217 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 n.1
(1961).
80. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-56 (1951) (civil); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (Supp.
1963) (criminal).
81. Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 211 N.C. 175, 189 S.E. 507 (1937) ; see also Comment,
15 N.C.L. Rev. 282 (1937).
82. Evidence Amendment Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict. 578, c. 83, § 3.
83. Rumping v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] 3 All E.R. 256 (H.L.) ; Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] 1 All E.R. 827 (C.A.).
84. "The privilege is intended to secure freedom from apprehension in the mind of
the one [spouse] desiring to communicate . . . ; it thus belongs to the communicating
one [spouse]." 8 Wigmore, op. cit. spura note 58, §2340(1) (Emphasis Wigmore's.),
quoted with approval in McCord v. McCord, 140 Ga. 170, 78 S.E. 833, 835 (1913), and
cited with approval in McCormick, op. cit. supra note 59, § 87 n.4.
Ga. Code Ann. § 38-418 (Supp. 1963) provides: "There are certain admissions and
communications excluded from consideration of public policy. Among these are: 1. Communications between husband and wife."
85. Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] 1 All E.R. 827, 838 (C.A.)
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Can the New Mexico statute logically be construed to give the
privilege to the communicating spouse? A literal reading of it 8 and
normal rules of construction would seem to require the New Mexico
courts to follow the English courts' interpretation
of the English
7
statute, which is the basis of New Mexico's.

Our court has indicated that it will follow the decisions of the originating state construing a statute before its adoption in New Mexico
unless there is good reason for not doing so, in accord with the common notion that there is a 'presumption' that this is what the legislature intended when it adopted the statute. There appears to be little
difference in the court's attitude towards decisions8 8 of the originating
state handed down after adoption in New Mexico.
However, this "presumption" is overcome if the court concludes

that such construction is "not in accord with sound reasoning, common sense . . . or . . . would render the statute inconsistent with
other laws intended to be retained, or the public policy of" New
Mexico. 89 And any "presumption" in favor of the English rule can
be overcome by (1) an examination of the policy behind the privilege, or (2) an examination of the New Mexico waiver section,"0 or

(3) both.
[T]he privilege . . . [is] that of the spouse witness, who can, accordingly, if
he or she desires, disclose all confidential communications made to him or her
by his or her spouse, however unwilling that spouse may be to have the disclosure made. [Opinion of Greene, M.R.]
In Rumping v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] 3 All E.R. 256 (H.L.), the
House of Lords announced this was the correct interpretation of the English statute.
86. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12(a) (1953):
No husband shall be compelled to disclose any communication made by his
wife during the marriage, and no wife shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during the marriage.
87. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
88. Countryman, Attachment in New Mexico, 1 Natural Resources J. 303, 305 (1961).
(Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis Countryman's.)
Decisions of the originating state handed down after adoption in New Mexico
are 'not binding,' since they present 'no question of adopted construction.' Ickes
v. Brimhall, 42 N.M. 412, 416, 79 P.2d 942, 944 (1938) ; State v. State Bank,
38 N.M. 338, 342, 32 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1934). But they are 'entitled to respectful
consideration,' Cain v. Bowlby 114 F.2d 519, 523 (10 cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 710 (1940), and may be found 'highly persuasive.' Ickes v. Brimhall,
supra. See also Carney v. McGinnis, 358 P.2d 694 (N.M. 1961) [68 N.M. 68];
Lopez v. Singh, 53 N.M. 245, 247, 205 P.2d 492, 493 (1949).
Id. at 305 n.22.
89. McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 32, 85 P.2d 78, 81 (1938) ; see Laughlin v.
Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 32, 155 P.2d 1010, 1017 (1944) ; State v. Reed, 39 N.M. 44, 51,
39 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1935) ; Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 492, 185 Pac. 780, 790 (1919)
Ripley v. Astec Mining Co., 6 N.M. 415, 417, 28 Pac. 773, 774 (1892).
90. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12(f) (1953).
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The court could say that it is the public policy of New Mexico
to encourage and foster full and frank disclosures and confidences
between spouses, and the most effective way to do this is to assure
the communicating spouse that his confidential communications will
not, against his consent, be disclosed in court by the addressee
spouse. The court should adopt this reasoning. What other social
gain is to be fostered at the expense of the judicial investigation of
truth? Certainly the English rule does not protect marital confidences. 9 Under it,
if . . . [the witness] spouse wishes to protect the other he or she
will disclose what helps the other spouse but use this privilege to conceal communications if they would be injurious, but on the other
hand a spouse who has become unfriendly to the other spouse will

use this privilege to disclose communications if they9 2are injurious to
the other spouse but conceal them if they are helpful.
Furthermore it would appear that the enactment would protect a
husband or wife from being obliged to disclose a communication
made to him or her by the other but would not protect him or her
from being obliged to disclose a communication made by him or her to
the other.93

The New Mexico privileged communications statute was enacted
in 1880, 94 protecting only marital communications. It is ambiguous
-it does not expressly say what spouse is the holder of the privilege. It can be construed to give the privilege to the communicating
spouse (American view) or to the non-communicating spouse (English rule). In 1933, the Legislature amended the state to prevent disclosures of "any communication" from client to attorney, confessor
to clergyman, patient to doctor, and client to accountant without the
consent of the client, patient, or confessor 9 5 (who clearly is the holder of the privilege). The 1933 amendment also contained a waiver
91. In fact, in Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] 1 All E.R. 827, 838 (C.A.), the court said
that the English statute was not designed to protect marital confidences.
92. Rumping v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] 3 All E.R. 256, 259 (H.L.)
(opinion of Lord Reid).
93. Id. at 275 (opinion of Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest).
94. N.M. Laws 1880, ch. 12, § 7.
95. N.M. Laws 1933, ch. 33, §§ l(b)-(e); now N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-1-12(b)-(e)

(1953).

The doctor-patient section was amended by N.M. Laws 1939, ch. 235, § 1 (d).
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provision which is applicable to each of the specified classes of privileged communications, including the marital class. 8 It provides:
If a person offer himself as a witness and voluntarily testify with
reference to the communications specified in this Act [section], that
is to be deemed a consent to the examination of the person to whom
7
the communications were made as above provided .

The phrase "consent to the examination of the person to whom
the communications were made" expressly says that the communicating spouse, not the witness spouse, may waive the privilege. But the
communicating spouse must be the holder of the privilege in order
to be able to waive it. If the section granting the privilege is construed to deny the communicating spouse sole holder status, then
the two sections are inconsistent. It is reasonable to assume that the
Legislature did not intend the 1933 Amendment to effect this result. 8 Therefore, to remove any possible inconsistency between the
two sections, and to conform to the better view, the New Mexico
statute should be construed as making the communicating spouse the
sole holder of the privilege."

Iv
WAIVER AND ERRONEOUS DENIAL OF THE PRIVILEGE

The New Mexico statute' 1° makes it clear that the privilege can
be waived. But is the statute exclusive, i.e., can there be a waiver
only by the holder offering "himself as a witness and voluntarily
testify[ing] with reference to the communications . . . .
96. When the statute was amended, the privilege as to spousal communications was
reenacted. N.M. Laws 1933, ch. 33, § 1(a).
97. N.M. Laws 1933, ch. 33, § 1(f) ; now N.M. Stat. Ann. 20-1-12(f) (1953).
98. Reed v. Styron, 69 N.M. 262, 269, 365 P.2d 912, 917 (1961):
In statutory construction, the inquiry is to determine what particular words,
clauses or provisions mean and to determine the legislative intent. Statutes are
enacted as a whole and each part should be construed in connection with
every other part to ascertain the intent, and where a comparison of one clause
with the statute as a whole makes a meaning clear the act must be so construed
as to make the whole consistent.
99. This conclusion is not possible in England, because the English statutes do not
contain any waiver provisions. Since the witness spouse is the holder under the English
rule, it logically follows, say the English courts, that only he or she can waive it.
Rumping v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] 3 All E.R. 256 (H.L.) ; Shenton v.
Tyler, [1939] 1 All E.R. 827 (C.A.).
100. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12(f) (1953) ; see note 97 supra and accompanying text.
101. Ibid.
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and Pennsylvania

10 5

statutes also contain express waiver provisions ;106 but no decision in
these states has held that such statutes are exclusive. Rather, they
have indicated there are other forms of waiver. For example, the
Colorado statute provides:
If a person offer himself as a witness, that is to be deemed a consent to the examination; also the offer of a wife, husband, attorney,
clergyman, physician, surgeon or certified public accountant as a
witness, shall be deemed a consent to the examination, within the
meaning of subsections (1),
153-1-7

.107

(2), (3),

(4), and (6) of section

Yet, the privilege can also be waived by an express waiver on the
stand by the holder,'0 8 by the communicating spouse's requesting or
authorizing the addressee spouse to show a written communication
to a third person,'0 9 and by the communicating spouse's taking the
stand and requesting a letter he has written to be produced in order
to refresh his memory." 0 The Colorado courts seem to have taken
the correct approach. Since the communication is not confidential
unless the communicator intended it to be,"' disclosure by the addressee spouse should not be prevented when the communicating
spouse has indicated, by his words or conduct, that it be made pub112
lic.
102. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-8 (1953).
103. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-29 (Supp. 1963).
104. Ore. Rev. Stat. §44.040(2) (Supp. 1963).
105. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 684 (1930) (criminal) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, §§ 316,
320 (1958) (civil).
106. The Kansas and South Dakota statutes contain waiver provisions, but they are
not applicable to the spousal communications privilege. See Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 602805 (1949) ; S.D. Code § 36.0102(Supp. 1960).
107. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-8 (1953).
108. Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920) (dictum).
109. Ibid.
In Colorado, the privilege belongs to the communicating spouse. See notes 71 and
75 supra and accompanying text.
110. Hill v. Hill, 106 Colo. 492, 107 P.2d 597, 599 (1940). Hill involved the attorneyclient privilege, but the waiver provision is applicable to all of the listed privileged
groups of communications, as is New Mexico's.
111. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
112.
'The spouse possessing the privilege may of course waive it. The waiver
may be found in some [extra judicial disclosure or in some] act or testimony
which in fairness places the person in a position not to object consistently to
further disclosure, * * W
Swearingen v. Vik, 51 Wash. 2d 843, 322 P.2d 876, 880 (1958), quoting from 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2340(2) (3d ed. 1940). (Emphasis Wigmore's.)
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Waiver has also been found where the communicating spouse
identified certain communications upon cross-examination' 3 and
where the communicating spouse told police officers to "ask my
wife" if he had murdered the decedent. 1 4
Where the privilege belongs only to the communicating spouse
and he has waived it, the other spouse cannot object.""
But consider the following situation: An action against a third
party is being tried in a jurisdiction which holds that only the communicating spouse possesses the privilege; but the communicating
spouse is not a party to, or a witness in, the proceeding. His wife is
called as a witness and is about to testify to a declaration he made
against his pecuniary interest which qualifies as a confidential communication. Can the testimony be kept out, and, if so, on whose motion? If the communicating spouse is present in court, it seems that
he may be the only one who can object."' But he cannot complain if
his objection is overruled. If he is not present in court, the judge, in
his discretion, may protect the privilege on his own motion or by
objection of the party or the witness spouse.' 7 But if the judge fails
to protect the privilege, the party cannot complain since it belongs to
the absent spouse." 8
Suppose, however, the communicating spouse is a witness for the
113. Patterson v. Skoglund, 181 Ore. 167, 180 P.2d 108 (1947).
114. Hunt v. State, 235 Ind. 276, 133 N.E.2d 48, 50 (1956).
But see Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1950) (civil)
In all civil actions, husband and wife may testify for or against each other,
provided that neither may testify as to any communication or admission made
by either of them to the other or as to any conversation between them during
coverture, except in actions between such husband and wife, and in actions
where the custody or support of their children is directly in issue, and as to
matters in which either has acted as agent for the other.
Under this statute, the doctrine of waiver is apparently inapplicable; a spouse may not
testify even when the communicating spouse does not object to the testimony. See also
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-2805 (1949).
115. Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1945).
116. But merely by being in the courtroom and remaining silent during the testimony
of the other spouse, the communicating spouse does not waive the privilege. Mere
silence is not enough; the consent required must be active rather than passive. McKinnon v. Chenoweth, 176 Ore. 74, 155 P.2d 944 (1945).
See also Uniform Rule of Evidence 28(1).
117. See Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920), supra note 71, where the
court permitted the prosecution to assert the privilege for the holder, its witness. The
court did not indicate whether or not the holder was in the courtroom when the privilege was asserted.
118. See Patterson v. Skoglund, 181 Ore. 167, 180 P.2d 108 (1947) (dictum) ; see
also McCormick, Evidence § 87 (1954); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2340(3) (McNaughton
rev. 1961) ; Ball, Standing to Claim Privileges in Ohio, 24 Ohio St. L.J. 115, 127-30
(1963).
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third party and claims the privilege. It has been held that if the
court erroneously denies it and the third party objects, the overruling of the objection is not sufficient ground for reversal and a
new trial, because (1) the offered testimony is relevant and (2) the
only interest injured is that of the witness, not the third party." 9 If
the witness desires to prevent disclosure, he should refuse to testify,
and, upon being committed for contempt, sue out a writ of habeas
corpus.
Although this view may be logically correct, it would seem desirable to allow the party to take advantage of the court's denial.
Otherwise, error by the court will not be sufficiently checked. If the
court rules in the objecting party's favor, evidence will be excluded
to the injury of the offering party who can object; while if the opponent (third party) cannot object to a denial of the privilege, the
court will be tempted to deny it and avoid a chance of reversal on
appeal. Also, very few witnesses will be willing to subject themselves
to contempt proceedings and possible imprisonment if the question
12 0
of privilege is decided against them. Rather, they will testify.
Therefore, the New Mexico courts should adopt the rule that where
the holder spouse is not a party but is a witness, an erroneous affirmation or denial of the privilege shall be ground for a new trial, by
both a party against whom an erroneous affirmation was entered
and a party against whom an erroneous denial was entered. 2 '
V
SCOPE AND DURATION OF THE PRIVILEGE

A. Communications While Married
Since the privilege is designed to encourage communications between spouses, it applies only to communications made during the
marital status, not before the spouses were married 122 nor after the
119. Coles v. Harsch, 129 Ore. 11, 276 Pac. 248 (1929) ; see also 8 Wigmore, op. cit.
supra note 118, § 2340(3).

120. See Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 686
(1922).
121. See State v. Snook, 94 N.J.L. 271, 109 At. 289 (1920) (dissenting opinion of an
equally divided court) ; cf. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-32(1) (Supp. 1963) ; Uniform
Rule of Evidence 40.
See also Martin v. State, 203 Miss. 187, 33 So. 2d 825 (1948) ; Ball, op. cit. supra
note 118, at 127-30; McCormick, op. cit. supra note 118, § 73.
122. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, adhered to, 138 F.2d 831 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944) ; Halback v. Hill, 261 Fed. 1007 (D.C. Cir.
1919); Inman v. State, 65 Ark. 508, 47 S.W. 558 (1898) ; Wiley v. Wiley, 178 Ky. 501,
199 S.W. 47 (Ct. App. 1917) ; Commonwealth v. Barronian, 235 Mass. 364, 126 N.E.

833 (1920) ; Forshay v. Johnston, 144 Neb. 525, 13 N.W.2d 873 (1944) ; In re Tilton's
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marriage relation has terminated. 121 It has been extended to communications made during a purported marriage which is later annulled for fraud by the victim, 124 but not to a bigamous marriage. 2
Courts are divided as to whether the privilege applies to communications made between spouses living in separation. 2 6
B. Effect of Death or Divorce
1. American Rule
27
The generally announced rule in the United States, by statute
and decision,'128 is that the communications privilege, unlike the antimarital privilege, continues after death or divorce. This rule, favored by Wigmore,'129 is based on the assumption that it tends to encourage full disclosure and confidence while the marital relation
subsists. 30 Thus, in a state where the privilege belongs to the communicating spouse, a husband may prevent the admission of letters
written by him to his wife before their divorce in an action brought
after her death.''
Estate, 129 Neb. 872, 263 N.W. 217 (1935) ; Bolen v. Humes, 94 Ohio App. 1, 114
N.E.2d 281 (1951) ; Harp v. State, 158 Tenn. 510, 14 S.W.2d 720 (1929).
123. Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935) (divorce); Shepherd
v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 1304, 300 N.W. 556 (1941) (divorce).
124. People v. Godines, 17 Cal. App. 2d 721, 62 P.2d 787 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1936),
25 Calif. L. Rev. 619 (1937) ; contra, Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.
1960) (dictum).
125. People v. Dake, 8 Cal. Rptr. 283, 185 Cal. App. 2d 525 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1960) People v. Richardson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 61, 182 Cal. App. 2d 620 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1960) ; People v. Keller, 165 Cal. App. 2d 419, 332 P.2d 174 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ;
Cole v. Cole, 153 Ill. 585, 38 N.E. 703 (1894) ; contra, Thomas v. Thomas' Estate, 64
Neb. 581, 90 N.W. 630 (1902).
126. Privilege applies: People v. Oyola, 6 N.Y.2d 259, 160 N.E.2d 494 (1959) ; People v. Harris, 39 Misc. 2d 193, 240 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1963) ; McCoy v. Justice, 199
N.C. 602, 155 S.E. 452 (1930) ; Pugsley v. Smyth, 98 Ore. 448, 194 Pac. 686 (1921),
distinguishing State v. Wilkins, 72 Ore. 77, 142 Pac. 589 (1914) ; Murphy v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 960 (1873).
Privilege does not apply: Holyoke v. Holyoke's Estate, 110 Me. 469, 87 At. 40
(1913) ; McEntire v. McEntire, 107 Ohio St. 510, 140 N.E. 328 (1923).
127. See the statutes of Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, cited in note 19 supra.
128. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
129. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 118, § 2341.
130. Ibid. See also Chafee, op. cit. supra note 120, at 692.
131. Ex tarte Bryant, 106 Ore. 359, 210 Pac. 454, 456 (1922):
The fact that since these letters were written she secured a divorce from her
husband, or the fact that she has since died, does not affect the rule. Neither
the death nor divorce of one spouse, nor both of these things combined, removes
the prohibition by which the law prevents the disclosure of confidential communications made to such spouse by the other during marriage.
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What is the result when the communicating spouse has died and
the communication is sought to be introduced? No problem is presented in a jurisdiction where the privilege belongs to both spouses,
the survivor is in a position to invoke it, and the survivor does invoke it. 132 But suppose the surviving spouse waives the privilege or
is not in a position to assert it, or the privilege belonged only to the
deceased communicating spouse. In an action brought against the
decedent's estate, a Pennsylvania court has indicated that the privilege passes to, and may be asserted by, the executor or administrator
to exclude testimony of the surviving spouse concerning the communication. 33
However, some courts have excluded such testimony by the surviving spouse when the administrator was not in a position to assert
the privilege by declaring that the survivor is "incompetent" to disclose the communication. 3 4 This line of reasoning is untenable. It
not only tends to confuse "competency" with "privilege,"' 8 5 it can
exclude testimony where it is fairly clear that, if alive, the communicating spouse would want the other spouse to testify. For example, in Jackson v. Jackson, 36 the plaintiff, administratrix of her
deceased husband's estate, sued the defendant on a promissory note
132. See, e.g., Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
133. In Huffman v. Simmons, 131 Pa. Super. 370, 200 At. 274 (1938), the plaintiff
brought an action in assumpsit against the decedent's estate to recover under the terms
of an indenture of apprenticeship. The decendent's wife testified on behalf of the
plantiff that the decedent had told her that he had never paid the plaintiff. The court
indicated that the privilege belonged to both spouses and that the husband's privilege
passed to the administrators of the decedent's estate. But the court held that the privilege had been waived
(1) by the failure of the wife to claim it; (2) by the failure of the defendants
[the administrators], in stating their objections to the offer of Mrs. Dalbey's
testimony, to include, as ground for objection, that it was a confidential communication between husband and wife.
200 At. at 278.
134. In Stanley v. Montgomery, 102 Ind. 102, 26 N.E. 213 (1885), the plaintiff, a
widow, sued the defendant, who was not the administrator of the estate of the plaintiff's
deceased husband, on a bond. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's introduction of
certain communications made to her by the decedent. On appeal from a judgment for
the plaintiff, the supreme court held
that the widow . . . was not a competent witness to testify to communications
made to her by her deceased husband during the marriage, and that the [trial]
court erred in permitting her to testify as to such communications.
Id. at 109, 26 N.E. at 215.
135. The Indiana Supreme Court would be hard pressed to explain its holding in
Stanley v. Montgomery, supra note 134, in light of Hunt v. State, 235 Ind. 276, 133
N.E.2d 48 (1956), wherein it held that the statute creates a privilege which may be
waived.
136. 40 Ga. 150 (1869).
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payable to the decedent's order. The trial court permitted the plaintiff to testify, over the defendant's objection, about certain marital
communications between her and the decendent. In reversing the
judgment for the plaintiff, the Georgia Supreme Court said:
Mrs. Jackson was a competent witness on the trial of the case . . .
but she should not be allowed to testify as to any fact which come
[sic] to her knowledge by reason of the confidential relation of husband and wife, during her coverture, as the wife of her deceased husband .... 137
The court's permitting the defendant to assert the privilege is appalling in light of the facts that ( 1 ) in Georgia the privilege belongs
only to, and may be waived by, the communicating spouse,'138 (2) the
personal representative of the holder's estate was a party to the suit,
and (3) the widow's testimony could only benefit the decedent's estate. Since the plaintiff, as administratrix, waived the privilege, her
testimony should have been admitted. Fortunately, the Jackson type
reasoning cannot be used in New Mexico because the question of
"competency" can no longer arise. The statutes provide that one
spouse may be compelled to testify for or against the other in civil
actions 139 and for the other in criminal actions, 140 the anti-marital
privilege is a "privilege,"'' and the marital communications privilege is a "privilege"'1 42 that can be waived by the holder. 4 '
If the administrator is not in a position to assert the privilege,
then the trial judge, in his discretion, could protect the privilege on
his own motion or by objection of the party or the surviving spouse
(in a jurisdiction where only the deceased communicating spouse is
the holder) .14
2. English Rule
The English courts have rejected the American view and hold
that the communications privilege does not survive termination of
the marriage. In Shenton v. Tyler,4 5 the Court of Appeals, after
137. Jackson v. Jackson, 40 Ga. 150, 153 (1869).
138. McCord v. McCord, 140 Ga. 170, 78 S.E. 833 (1913). The Georgia statute is
quoted in note 84 supra.
139. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-9 (1953).
140. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-1-12 (1953).
141. State. v. Trujillo, 60 N.M. 277, 291 P.2d 315 (1955).
142. N.M. Stat. Ann. §20-1-12(a) (1953).
143. N.M. Stat. Ann. §20-1-12(f) (1953).
144. See notes 117-18 supra and accompanying text.
145. [1939] 1 All E.R. 827 (C.A.).
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deciding that the privilege belongs only to the addressee-witness
spouse, 4 ' held that the English statute, 47 providing that "husbands" and "wives" shall not be compellable to testify to marital
communications, could not be construed to exempt the defendant, a
surviving widow, from interrogation as to communications made to
her by her deceased husband which the plaintiff claimed had created
a secret trust in his favor:
The section in terms relates only to husbands and wives, and no principle of construction known to me entitles me to read into48 the section a reference to widowers or widows or divorced persons.1
McCormick concurs with this holding in Shenton :149
The privilege for confidential communications of the spouses . . .
was based (in the mind of its chief sponsor, Greenleaf) upon the
policy of encouraging confidences and its sponsor thought that such
encouragement required not merely temporary but permanent secrecy.
The courts in this country have accepted this need for permanent
protection-though it is obviously a most unrealistic assumption-and

about one-half of our statutes codifying the privilege explicitly provide that it continues after death or divorce. It is probably in these
cases where the marital tie has been severed, that the supposed policy
of the privilege has the most remote and tenuous relevance, and the

possibilities of injustice in its application are most apparent. 150

It is submitted that McCormick's argument is sound and should
be adopted by the New Mexico courts. This can be accomplished by
using the following reasoning process: ( 1) the New Mexico statute
is based on England's;' 5 ' (2) although Shenton is "not binding" because it was decided subsequent to New Mexico's adoption of the
English statute, it is "highly persuasive" in construing New Mexico's statute ;5 2 (3) the public policy of New Mexico is to encourage
and foster full and frank disclosures and confidences between
146. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
147. Evidence Amendment Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict. 578, c. 83, § 3, quoted in note 1S
supra.

148. Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] 1 All E.R. 827, 841 (C.A.) (opinion of Greene, M.R.).
149.
[I]t seems clear that the actual holding [in Shenton] that the privilege for
communications ends when the marriage ends is far preferable in policy to the
contrary result reached under American statutes and decisions.
McCormick, Evidence § 89 (1954) ; accord, Uniform Rule of Evidence 28.
150. McCormick, op. cit. supra note 149, § 89. (Footnotes omitted.)
151. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
152. See note 88 supra.
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spouses, and the most effective way to do this is to assure the communicating spouse that his confidential communications will not,
against his consent, be disclosed in court by the addressee spouse;
(4) it is also the public policy of New Mexico to have full disclosure
of truth in court in order that justice may prevail; (5) therefore, in
order to properly balance these two opposing policies, and because
there is no policy which prevents the court from following Shenton, 5 3 the statute will be given a literal reading so as to terminate
the privilege upon the divorce of the spouses or the death of the
communicating spouse.
VI
EXCEPTIONS

The New Mexico statutes expressly provide that confidential
marital communications may be disclosed in civil proceedings "of
the question of the adultery of any party, or the husband or wife of
any party to such action, suit or other proceeding,"" 4 and for nonsupport.' 5
There are no express exceptions in criminal actions. However, the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony (i.e., the anti-marital
privilege) is subject to the following exceptions:
[I]f willing the husband or wife of a defendant may testify against
the defendant without the defendant's consent where the prosecution
is for any of the following crimes: incest, bigamy, unlawful cohabitation, abandonment of dependents, or any unlawful violence forcibly
committed or attempted against the spouse testifying or the children
of both or either of the parties. 5 "

McCormick, 57 Wigmore,'1 8 and some courts' have suggested that
these exceptions should apply also to the communications privilege. 60
153. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
154. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-11 (1953).
155. N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-19-25 (1953) (Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act).
156. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-1-12 (1953).
157. McCormick, Evidence § 88 (1954).
158. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2338(1) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949) (dictum).
160.
We do not forget that a wife from the earliest times was competent to testify against her husband, when the crime was an offense against her person
.. The same exception probably extends to the privilege against the admission of confidential communications.
Ibid.
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It is submitted that this suggestion should not be adopted by the
New Mexico courts because it fails to distinguish between the separate and distinct policies behind each privilege. The anti-marital
privilege is designed to protect and preserve domestic harmony and
the sanctity of the marital relation.'6 1 And it is reasonable to assume
that the Legislature intended that when one spouse has committed
incest, bigamy, etc., there is no domestic harmony or sanctimonious
marriage to protect and preserve. Hence, the other spouse may
testify against the defendant spouse as to his or her observances. On
the other hand, the marital communications privilege is designed to
encourage full and frank disclosures and confidences between
spouses. 162 And it is not reasonable to assume that where, for example, the defendant is accused of the statutory rape of his stepdaughter, the Legislature intended that under the statute providing
for exceptions to the anti-marital privilege 163 the accused's wife
should be able to testify against him not only as to what she observed but also as to his statement made in confidence to her that he
had raped the child. 6 Unless the court were to find that the defendant did not intend the communication to be confidential,16 5 the wife
could not disclose it without violating the privilege's policy (assuming the holder of the privilege to be the communicating spouse).
However, if the court were to find that the policy of full disclosure
in such cases outweighs the policy behind the communications privilege, then the communication could be disclosed without violating
the policy of either privilege.
ROBERT

M.

SANDERFORD

161. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
162. See note 15 jupra and accompanying text.
However, this is not to say that the communications privilege may not effect a
strengthing of the marital bond. It is hoped that it will, but this is the primary purpose
of the anti-marital privilege.
In addition to the spousal relationship, the communications privilege has been extended, by statute in most states including New Mexico, to the attorney-client, clergyman-confessor, and doctor-patient relationships. The purpose in each relationship is
basically the same: to encourage full disclosure and confidence. The spouse, attorney,
clergyman, or doctor is seeking to aid the other spouse, client, confessor, or patient.
Full disclosure is essential for effective assistance. And to encourage full disclosure,
the privilege assures the communicating spouse, client, confessor, or patient that his disclosures will not, without his consent, be made public, even if this means the suppression of evidence which may be determinative of the outcome of the case. See N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 20-1-12(a)-(e) (1953).
163. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-1-12 (1953) ; see note 156 .upra and accompanying text.
164. See People v. Oyola, 6 N.Y.2d 259, 160 N.E.2d 494, 189 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1959)
(rape of daughter; husband's alleged admission to wife held privileged).
165. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.

